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Abstract 
We examine national trends in educational funding, test score outcomes, and productivity as well 
as variations in funding and test scores over time and across states to assess how changes in 
educational spending are (or are not) related to changes in educational test score outcomes for 
states.  National trends show small increases in test scores, large increases in educational funding 
(until the last recession), and a continued fall in educational productivity.  The cross-state, over 
time analysis indicates a statistically significant but very small association of state funding to test 
scores; so small that large changes in funding have little effect on scores. This is consistent with 
the continued decline in educational productivity.  We also find similar results for black students, 
implying that the increased funding has not served to reduce racial inequality. We suggest that 
the continued decline in productivity of public schools adds further reason to question the ability 
of non-competitive, public organizations to improve educational performance and to look for 
alternatives that embrace or emulate private-sector, competitive organizations.   
*For helpful comments, we thank Aaron Yelowitz, Frank Scott, James Fackler, John Merrifield
and session participants at the Southern Economic Association annual conference and the
Association of Private Enterprise Education annual meetings.  We are also grateful to the John
H. Schnatter Institute for Free Enterprise and the BB&T Program for the Study of Capitalism,
both at the University of Kentucky, for support.
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I.  Introduction 
 Concerns about the performance of traditional public schools have been with us for quite 
a number of years.  Though disputes regarding school funding seem to occur regularly, the data 
are clear in showing increasing resources being devoted to public schools over the past several 
decades.  The increasing use of resources has reinforced concerns regarding public school 
performance. Essentially, this is a question about what is being attained with the dollars spent on 
K-12 education.   
  Thus, an important aspect of this paper is to examine the relationship of school funding 
to student outcomes.  A closely related concept is the productivity of education spending, i.e., 
educational “output” (or outcome) per dollar spent.  In an examination of this question over ten 
years ago, Hoxby (2004) finds that the productivity of public education declined substantially – 
by nearly 50 percent – from the 1970s to 2000.  Her measure of educational outcomes is the 
National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) test scores.  From 1970 to 2000, these 
scores hardly changed, yet inflation-adjusted, per-pupil spending almost doubled.   
There have been some signs of improvement in the NAEP test scores in the 2000s, 
though these experiences have varied across states, as have changes in resources devoted to 
schools.  Accordingly, this paper considers two related aspects of these issues.  First, we update 
overall national trends on educational funding, test score outcomes, and productivity.  Second, 
we examine variations in funding and test scores over time and across states to assess how 
changes in educational spending are (or are not) related to changes in educational test score 
outcomes for states. 
Our findings regarding national trends show small increases in test scores, large increases 
in educational funding (until the last recession), and a continued fall in educational productivity.  
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The cross-state, over time analysis indicates a statistically significant but very small association 
of state funding to test scores.  Our preferred estimates imply that the magnitude is so small that 
higher funding of $1,000 is associated with trivially higher NAEP test scores.1  This is consistent 
with the continued decline in productivity that we verify in the cross-state data.  Also, note that 
we find the patterns for black students are essentially the same as for all students, implying that 
the increased funding has not served to raise minority outcomes and reduce racial inequality.   
Hoxby (2004) suggests that the decline in the productivity of K-12 education is due to the 
decline of competition among jurisdictions for students and provides evidence to support this.  
Moreover, there is a good deal of literature regarding the incentive problems of government-
operated organizations that face little competition, which characterizes most public schools.  For 
an overview and discussion of this literature as it pertains to schools, see Garen (2016).  The 
results of our paper are consistent with Hoxby (2004).  Though it is appropriate to be cautious 
regarding causality with respect to funding and outcomes, the continued decline in productivity 
of public schools that we find adds further reason to question the ability of non-competitive, 
public organizations to improve educational performance and to look for alternatives that 
embrace or emulate private-sector, competitive organizations.   
The question of the effect of school resources and spending on educational outcomes has 
a long history.  Coleman (1966) was perhaps the first to do a broad-based examination of the 
importance of school resources in K-12 education, finding that other factors were much more 
critical.  Hanushek (1986) reviews the empirical work that followed Coleman (1966), indicating 
that differences in school quality do not seem to reflect variations in expenditure, class size, or 
other commonly measured attributes of schools and teachers.  A good deal of empirical work on 
                                                            
1 See Merrifield (2009) for a related analysis.  He takes extant estimates of the effects of resources on school 
outcomes and simulates the effect of substantially greater resources.  He finds very small effects.   
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this topic continued with improved data and more advanced methods.  Later surveys by 
Hanushek (2003), Gustafsson (2003), and Glewwe (2013) find strong effects of teachers but an 
absence of consistent effects of school expenditures in reviews of research pertaining to many 
countries around the world.  These lack-of-effects findings are the norm.  However, there are 
some exceptions, and some studies find positive effects on the subsequent earnings and 
employment experiences of students “exposed” to higher education spending when young.  See, 
for example, Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2016), Fredriksson, Ockert, Oosterbeek (2013), and 
Card and Krueger (1992).  Betts (1995), however, following a similar methodology, finds no 
effects of school resources, consistent with the bulk of the literature.   
 Our paper fits into this stream of research with focus on the recent experiences of states 
in the U.S.   Though the small effects of expenditures on public school performance suggests an 
evaluation of alternative types of school organizations (e.g., charter schools and voucher 
programs), this is beyond the scope of this paper.  The reader is referred to Garen (2016) for a 
discussion and critique of that literature.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses our measure of 
educational outcomes, as well as our data on school expenditures.  We follow Hoxby (2004) and 
others in using the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test scores to measure 
educational outcomes.  Section III provides an update on and discussion of the long-term trend in 
productivity in education in the U.S. from 1971 to 2012.  As we detail below, though test scores 
have improved in the recent past, spending rose even faster and productivity continues to decline.  
Section IV examines the data on test scores and spending by state and over time to assess the 
association of test score improvements with increased state spending.  We find a positive and 
statistically significant association, though very small in magnitude, e.g., a $1,000 increment to 
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per pupil spending is associated with minimal changes in NAEP test scores.  The findings for 
black students are approximately the same, indicating that the funding has not reduced racial 
inequality in test scores.  We also find somewhat more robust effects of local funding relative to 
state and federal, though magnitudes remain small.  The decline in educational productivity is 
also verified in the cross-state panel data.  Lastly, section V concludes.  
II. Measuring Educational Outcomes 
We follow Hoxby (2004) in using the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) test scores as our measure of educational outcomes.  We utilize the mathematics test 
scores and the reading test scores of 4th and 8th graders.  The NAEP is the largest nationally 
representative and continuing assessment of the nation’s students. Since NAEP assessments are 
administered uniformly using the same sets of test booklets across the nation, they provide a 
common measure of student achievement across the country.  The assessments stay essentially 
the same from year to year, with only carefully documented changes to reflect changes in 
curriculum in the nation’s schools.  NAEP’s long-term trend assessment is a national sample 
begun in the 1970s and currently is given every four years.  The state assessments began in the 
1990s and allows comparisons across states.  It is now conducted every two years.  These 
assessments are referred to as The Nation’s Report Card.  More detail is in National Center for 
Educational Statistics (2017).   
The common measures across states and over time are a great advantage over other test-
based data sets.  Many states have conducted tests for a long time, but they are not consistent 
over time or across states.  However, there are criticisms of test scores as measures of 
educational outcomes.  Ultimately, the desired outcome from education is its enabling people to 
improve their lives.  This can be through improvements in a variety of ways, such as school 
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completion, improved earnings, higher levels of employment, better health, and other outcomes.  
As noted above, there are studies that relate the subsequent labor market experiences of people to 
their school environment when young.  However, these data are often limited in scope.  Also, the 
NAEP tests, and others like them, measure important aspects of cognitive skills.  However, it is 
becoming increasingly recognized that non-cognitive skills, such as persistence, motivation, and 
dependability, have great importance in determining success in life.  See Heckman, Stixrud, and 
Urzua (2006).  NAEP test score outcomes only indirectly measure these attributes.   
Nevertheless, it is well established that scores on tests similar to the NAEP are strongly 
correlated with a person’s labor market earnings.  See Currie and Thomas (2001), for example.   
Moreover, Hanushek, Ruhose, and Woessmann (2017) find that U.S. state GDP growth is related 
to the state’s average NAEP test score.  The NAEP test score outcomes measure something that 
matters. 
 We collect data on education spending and school enrollment from the National Center 
for Educational Statistics’ Digest of Education Statistics.  Several measures of spending are 
collected.  We collect data on the total school revenue collected by the state, as well as the total 
from each source; local, state, or federal.  We also obtain data on total expenditures, current 
expenditures, and instructional expenditures (available only since 1986).  Each is expressed on a 
per pupil basis using enrollment data.  It is also adjusted for inflation and expressed in constant 
2016 dollars.    
III. National Trends in Scores, Spending, and Productivity 
 This section presents national long-term trends in NAEP scores from NAEP’s Long-Term 
Trend Assessment, along with national educational spending data from the Digest of Education 
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Statistics.  Test scores are national averages.  Revenue and expenditure data are per pupil 
national averages.   
 Figure 1 presents a graph of the gains in NAEP reading scores since 1971 for both grade 
4 and grade 8.  This is calculated by subtracting the 1971 score from the actual score in each year 
the test was given.2  The latest year available is 2012.  The raw data for these computations is in 
appendix Table A1.  The dashed (blue) line is for grade 4 and the solid (red) line represents 
grade 8.  As can be seen, the gains in test scores are small, especially through the late 1990s.  
Grade 4 scores have improved through the 2000s.  There is an uptick in grade 8 scores beginning 
in 2008.   
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                            
2 The scale of this graph (-30 to +30) is selected because the standard deviation of individual NAEP test scores is 
roughly 30 each year.   
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 Figure 2 shows similar calculations for grade 4 and grade 8 NAEP math scores.  These 
are gains from 1978 since that is the first year the math tests were given.  Again, the raw data is 
in appendix Table A1.  Here, there is a persistent upward trend in test scores through most of this 
time period.   
Figure 2 
 
 Figure 3 presents a graph of per pupil revenue and expenditure for public schools in the 
U.S. from 1971 to 2012.  They are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2016 dollars.  The data 
for Figure 3, as well as Figures 4 and 5, are in appendix Table A2.  In Figure 3, revenue per pupil 
is the dashed (blue) line and expenditure is the solid (red) line.  They track one another very 
closely and their correlation coefficient is .9988.  There is a strong and persistent upward trend.  
There have been only a handful of years until 2010 in which education revenue or expenditure 
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fell or was unchanged.  The declines in years 2010 to 2012 are due to the effects of the recent 
recession and the consequent reductions in state and local budgets.   
Figure 3 
 
 Figure 4 shows the graph of per pupil education revenue by the source of that revenue.  
The dashed (blue) line is state revenue, the higher solid (red) line is local revenue, and the lower 
solid (green) line is federal revenue.  Both state and local revenue generally show a similar 
pattern to that of total revenue; strong upward trends until the years of the recent recession.  
Federal revenue shows a much more modest increase, though this picked up in the early 2000s.  
In the later 2000s, there was a sharp increase in the aftermath of the recession, then a decline.  
 Figure 5 displays some components of total expenditures.  The dashed (blue) is the time 
path of current expenditures (all expenditures less capital expenses).  The solid (red) line is 
instructional expenditure, available only since 1986.  These both show a pattern very similar to  
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Figure 4 
 
 
that of total expenditures; rising substantially throughout this time period except for the period 
immediately following the recent recession. 
 The next set of figures (6 and 7) examine and update the trend in the productivity of 
educational funding.  This is computed as the NAEP test score per $1,000 of educational 
revenue.  This can be thought as the effectiveness of education dollars in producing educational 
outcomes.  We compute this ratio for each of the four NAEP tests we are considering.  These 
productivity data are reported in appendix table A3.  Figure 6 shows the plot over time for grades 
4 and 8 reading scores.   
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  Figure 5 
 
Figure 6 
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 The dashed (blue) line in Figure 6 is for grade 4 and the solid (red) line is for grade 8.  
Both display an essentially continuous downward trend for the entire time period.  The exception 
is the last two years of tests that show an uptick.  This is largely due to the post-recession decline 
in education spending.  From 2008 to 2012, education revenue per pupil fell by 4%.  However, 
grade 4 reading scores increased by ½ of 1% and grade 8 reading scores rose by 1%.  Thus, most 
of the increased productivity in this time frame was due to declining funding.  
Figure 7 shows the plot of productivity for grade 4 and grade 8 math.  There is a general 
similarity to the reading score plot; an overall and mostly continuous downward trend.  Here, 
there is an exception between the 1978 and 1982 tests, as well as for the final 2008 to 2012 
period.   
Figure 7 
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 Visually, the rates of decline seem sharpest prior to 1990, followed by smaller declines in 
the 1990s, then further declines in the 2000s that are not as large as in the earliest period.  This is 
verified in Table 1 below.  We show the annual average decline in productivity for each test for 
three time periods:  1990 and before, 1990 to 1999, and 1999 and after.  For the last period, we 
consider both the 1999 – 2008 period and the 1999 – 2012 period, where the former excludes the 
effect of the last recession.  
 Table 1 verifies the visual analysis.  Up through 1990, the annual average absolute 
decline in productivity for each test ranges from 0.62 points per year to 0.90.  The percent 
decline is about 2% per year for each test.  During the 1990s, the decline in productivity 
continued, but at a slower rate.  For each test, the absolute decline was roughly 0.30 points per 
year, or a little over 1% reduced productivity per year.  From 1999 to 2008, productivity fell 
faster than in the 1990s, but slower than the earlier period.  Declines in lost points per year 
ranged from 0.34 to 0.5, translating into percentage reductions between 1.6% and 2.0%.  With 
the time period 1999 to 2012, absolute and percentage reductions are the smallest due to the 
2008 to 2012 uptick.  Note, though, in none of these time periods did productivity rise.  The 
differences are how quickly it declines.   
 Figures 8 and 9 plot the productivity for all students (as in previous figures), along with 
the productivity for black student scores, i.e., the average NAEP score for black students per 
$1,000 of educational revenue.  This addresses the issue of whether the additional funding for 
schools over this time period was targeted toward minorities in order to raise their scores and 
educational outcomes, and thereby reduce racial inequality.  If this were the case, we expect to 
see higher black student test scores per $1,000 of spending relative to all students.   
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Table 1 
Annual Average Absolute and Percent Decline in Productivity (NAEP Score per 
$1000):  Grades 4 and 8 Reading and Math 
 Grade 4 Reading Grade 8 Reading Grade 4 Math Grade 8 Math 
 Absolute 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Percent 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Absolute 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Percent 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Absolute 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Percent 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Absolute 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
Percent 
Annual 
Prod. 
Decline 
1990 
and 
before 
 
0.74 
 
2.1% 
 
0.90 
 
2.0% 
 
0.62 
 
2.0% 
 
0.82 
 
2.1% 
1990 to 
1999 
0.27 1.2% 0.34 1.3% 0.30 1.2% 0.32 1.1% 
1999 to 
2008 
0.34 1.7% 0.5 2.0% 0.35 1.6% 0.49 1.9% 
1999 to 
2012 
0.18 0.9% 0.26 1.1% 0.18 0.95% 0.24 1.0% 
 
Figure 8 
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 Figures 8 and 9 show that this did not occur.  Figure 8 is for grade 4 reading and Figure 9 
is for grade 8 reading.  In both figures, the dashed (blue) line represents all students and the solid 
(red) line for black students.  The trend in productivity for the two groups track one another 
almost exactly.  Black student productivity outcomes show the same pattern of decline as all 
students.  Repeating this exercise for math scores yields the same outcome.    
 
Figure 9 
 
 Overall, the findings for nationwide trends are not that different from Hoxby’s (2004), 
even with consideration of the last decade of data.  Test scores do show some improvement over 
the 2000s, but education spending increased rapidly until the last recession.  The productivity of 
educational funds continues to decline, albeit not as rapidly as in the 1970s and 1980s.  The 
pattern for productivity is the same for black students as all students.  
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IV. Spending and Test Scores Across States and Over Time 
 This section utilizes the state-level NAEP test score data and state-level educational 
funding to examine the relationship between school spending and test scores, as well as the 
productivity of school spending.  An advantage of these data is that states have varying 
experiences regarding changes in funding and test score outcomes over time, and states naturally 
vary in these respects at any point in time.  There is much greater variation in the relevant data 
than in the national data, and so ought to be more informative in assessing the association of 
spending and test scores.  We also consider the effects of spending on black student scores, 
examine if there are differences based on whether the source of funds is federal, state, or local, 
and reexamine the productivity of education funding with the cross-state panel.   
A. Summary Statistics and Econometric Specification 
 Appendix Table A4 shows the years the state-based NAEP tests were given.  The first 
began in 1990 and they were given at various times to most, though not all, states.  Since 2003, 
the assessments that we use have been given every two years to all states.  
 The basic methodology used is regression analysis of the form in equation (1). 
(1)                Tjt = b0 + b1Sjt + b2Xjt + θj + δt + εjt 
where j indexes states, t indexes time and: 
Tjt = state j’s average test score at time t (where we estimate separate equations for each test), 
Sjt = state j’s real per pupil funding at time t, 
Xjt = a vector of demographics for state j at time t, 
θj = a vector of state effect dummy variables, 
δt = a vector of year effect dummy variables, and  
εjt = white noise.  
16 
 
We adopt and report a number of specifications that utilize different subsets of the above 
variables.  The full specification allows for the influence of state spending on test scores, with 
controls for differences and changes in state demographics, state-specific influences, and time-
dependent effects.   
 Table 2 presents means and standard deviations, as well as variable definitions, for the 
test score, funding, and demographic variables.  The columns show these summary statistics for 
each test, with the data pooled across states and over time.  Prior to 2003, different tests were 
given at different intervals, so sample sizes are not the same for each test.  Also, the primary 
variable we use for school funding is real revenue per pupil, lagged one year.  The mean for this 
variable in each column is approximately $12,000 per pupil in 2016 dollars.3  We use funding 
with a one-year lag largely because the last year of test score data is 2015 and the last year of 
funding data is 2014.  Thus, using lagged funding enables us to use the 2015 test score data.  
However, dropping 2015 or using different lag lengths do not substantially change our findings.  
 The demographics we use include the racial composition of the state’s public school 
students, the percent of the state’s students eligible for the federal reduced price lunch program, 
the percent of students identified as English language learners, and the percent of students with 
disability.  States have some latitude in whether English language learners and students with 
disability are tested, so we include the percent of each that were assessed.  After 1998, states 
were enabled to test these two groups with accommodation, and we include the percent who 
were assessed with accommodation.  
 
 
                                                            
3 We also experimented using expenditures instead of revenue but with essentially identical findings. 
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Table 2:  Means (standard deviations), State Level NAEP Scores,  
Educational Revenue, and Demographics 
 
Variablea 
Grade 4 
Reading 
Grade 8 
Reading 
Grade 4 
Math 
Grade 8 
Math 
NAEP State Score 
218.29 
(8.03) 
263.23 
(6.76) 
234.25 
(10.56) 
276.87 
(11.07) 
Real revenue per pupil  
(lagged one year) 
12023.81 
(3422.29) 
12530.18 
(3389.74) 
12163.85 
(3432.21) 
11956.71 
(3439.64) 
Percent White students 
65.05 
(20.22) 
64.74 
(20.23) 
63.69 
(19.87) 
66.61 
(20.64) 
Percent Black students 
15.73 
(16.16) 
15.43 
(16.05) 
15.32 
(15.77) 
15.23 
(16.33) 
Percent Hispanic students 
11.64 
(13.54) 
11.57 
(12.79) 
12.99 
(12.97) 
10.69 
(12.55) 
Percent Reduced Price  
School Lunch Eligible 
41.89 
(13.78) 
42.95 
(11.47) 
43.22 
(13.55) 
39.41 
(13.42) 
Pct. Students English  
Language Learners 
7.66 
(7.38) 
5.74 
(5.59) 
6.27 
(6.02) 
3.70 
(3.64) 
Pct. of English Language 
Learners assessed 
5.99 
(6.59) 
4.60 
(5.07) 
5.52 
(5.68) 
3.12 
(3.39) 
Pct. of English Language 
Learners tested with  
accommodation 
2.69 
(4.08) 
2.26 
(3.73) 
2.56 
(2.74) 
1.28 
(1.45) 
Pct. of Students with  
Disability 
13.59 
(2.89) 
13.49 
(2.50) 
13.58 
(2.89) 
12.55 
(2.90) 
Pct. of Students with  
Disability assessed 
9.50 
(3.56) 
10.09 
(2.89) 
10.91 
(3.63) 
9.50 
(3.63) 
Pct. of Students with  
Disability tested with 
accommodation 
5.64 
(4.09) 
6.92 
(3.62) 
7.16 
(4.34) 
6.20 
(4.50) 
N (sample size) 523 436 484 517 
             aAll variables are statewide averages for each sample year. 
B. Basic Findings 
 Naturally, we are most interested in the coefficient b2, showing the relationship of state 
funding to test scores.  Table 3 shows the findings of four different specifications for the grade 4 
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reading exam.  The coefficient on funding is transformed to indicate the influence of $1,000 of 
per pupil funding.  The full set of coefficients is in appendix Table A5. Column (1) shows the  
Table 3:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 Reading Equation 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 4 Reading Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
.6119 
(6.16) 
.2567 
(2.94) 
.6992 
(6.51) 
.2549 
(2.18) 
Demographics no yes yes yes 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.0680 0.6432 0.8853 0.9108 
N 523 523 523 523 
 
results of a univariate regression of the test score on funding, with no control variables.  The 
coefficient of .6119 indicates that a $1,000 increase in per pupil funding is associated with a little 
over a 0.6 point rise in the grade 4 NAEP reading score.  Column (2) adds controls for the 
demographic variables since a state’s average score may be influenced by its demographic 
composition.  With this specification, the coefficient on funding falls to .2567, implying that 
additional funding of $1,000 per student is associated with just over a ¼ point higher test score. 
Because there are likely to be many difference across states not fully captured by the 
demographic variation, column (3) adds state fixed effects to account for them.  Doing so allows 
for different “baseline” levels for each state and so our results reflect the effects of within-state 
changes over time.  In this specification, the coefficient on funding is .6992, indicating that a 
$1,000 increase in funding by a state is associated with an almost 0.7 point higher test score.  
Lastly, column (4) adds time effect dummy variables.  This allows for nationwide trends from 
other, unmeasured sources to affect test scores and is the standard difference-in-differences 
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specification (with covariates), and is our preferred specification.  The results here reflect the 
effects of within-state changes in funding relative to other states as a whole.  Here, the 
coefficient on funding is .2549, implying that a $1,000 increase in funding is associated with a 
little over a ¼ point increase in the test score.4 
Care must be taken in interpreting these coefficients as causal.  Clearly, funding is 
endogenous to policy makers, and if unobservables drive both funding and test scores, the 
associations we find may not be causal.  However, the state and time effects may account for 
many of these unobservable factors.   
Note that all of the estimated effects of funding have a high degree of statistical 
significance.  However, the magnitudes of the effects are very small.  Focus on the estimates in 
columns (3) and (4).  These, we believe, are the most meaningful.  Recall that the column (4) 
specification accounts for demographics, state effects, and time effects, and shows the effect of 
changes in state funding relative to the nation.  Column (3) does not include the time effects, so 
the influence of unobserved, national trends may be attributed to the effect of funding.  Thus, the 
column (3) result is probably an upper-bound estimate of the influence of funding.   
Though the estimate of column (3) is over twice as large at that in column (4) – .6992 
compared to .2549 – both are small in magnitude.  A $1,000 increase in per pupil funding is 
associated with 0.7 test points for the former and ¼ point for the latter.  The yearly average for 
this test score is about 218, and the yearly standard deviation varies over time but ranges from 
about 6 to almost 10.  Thus, $1,000 “buys” only a very minimal change in the test score with 
either estimate.  Note that $1,000 is a substantial share of per pupil spending.  From Table 2, the 
                                                            
4 Though column (4) is our preferred specification, we report other specifications so the reader may gain a fuller 
picture of the findings.   
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average of per pupil spending is about $12,000 per year.  An increment of $1,000 is an 8.3% 
change.  
The theme from Table 3 recurs with the other tests:  effects that are statistically 
significant but very small in magnitude.  This is evident from Table 4, which shows the findings 
for the grade 8 reading test.  The full set of coefficients is in appendix Table A6.  Column (1) 
estimates the effect of $1,000 more in funding at .30 point, column (2) indicates .11 points, 
column (3) about .25 points, and column (4) .20 points.  Each is statistically significant except 
for the coefficient in column (2).  Regarding our preferred specifications of column (4) and the 
upper-bound estimate of column (3), their magnitudes are not that different and both are very 
small. Yearly standard deviations for this test range between 6 and 7.  Thus, a .20 or .25 change 
in the test score is quite minimal.   
Table 4:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 8 Reading Equation 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 8 Reading Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
.3064 
(3.24) 
.1131 
(1.57) 
.2478 
(3.09) 
.2033 
(2.35) 
Demographics no yes yes yes 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.0236 0.7636 0.9366 0.9499 
N 436 436 436 436 
 
 Table 5 presents the findings for grade 4 math NAEP test scores, with full results in 
appendix Table A7.  Focus again on columns (3) and (4).  The column (3) estimate indicates a 
gain of 1.22 points per $1,000 of funding, while that in column (4) shows 0.29 points.  The 
average score for this test is around 234, and yearly standard deviation ranges from 5 to 8.5.  
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Though the column (3) estimate is larger than that for the reading score, its magnitude is still not 
that large.  The magnitude of the column (4) estimate is small as previously.  
Table 5:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 Math Equation* 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 4 Math Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
1.2101 
(9.39) 
.2094 
(1.97) 
1.2159 
(8.14) 
.2902 
(2.55) 
Demographics no yes yes yes 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.1546 0.6981 0.8916 0.9538 
N 484 484 484 484 
 
 Lastly, Table 6 presents the findings for grade 8 math scores, with full results in appendix 
Table A8.  Regarding the coefficients in columns (3) and (4), the former indicates a gain of 1.39 
points per $1,000 of funding, while that in column (4) shows 0.52 points.  Given an average test 
score of around 234 and a yearly standard deviation that ranges from 7 to 11, the magnitude of 
either of these estimates is not especially large.  
Table 6:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 8 Math Equation 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 8 Math Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
1.1562 
(8.74) 
.437 
(3.41) 
1.3896 
(10.78) 
.5193 
(4.00) 
Demographics no yes yes yes 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.1291 0.6638 0.9171 0.9443 
N 517 517 517 517 
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 Table 7 summarizes the association of per pupil spending with test scores for each of the 
NAEP tests.  The first row of this table recaps the findings presented in Tables 3 through 6.  In 
particular, we show the effect of a $1,000 increase in per pupil funding based on the column (3) 
and the column (4) estimates.  The estimates without year effects are larger, though, as noted 
above, these are upper-bound estimates.  Also as noted, these effects are small in magnitude.  
 The second row of Table 7 presents another way to illustrate the magnitude of the effects.  
Based on the coefficient estimates, we calculate the additional funding needed to move each test 
score by one-half of a standard deviation.  With such a change, a state at the 33rd percentile of 
scores would move to the median, or a state at the median would move to the 66th percentile.  
Because the standard deviation of test scores varies from year to year, we use its average over 
time for each test.  
 As can be seen, these dollar values are quite large.  For grade 4 reading and the column 
(1) value, the additional required funds is $5,422.  Using the column (2) value, it is even larger at 
$14,863.  Note that the mean state per pupil funding (from Table 2) is about $12,000 and for 
2014 it is $13,362.  Thus, either of our computations imply a massive funding increase to attain 
such a score change:  a 40% rise with the column (1) computation – based on 2015 mean 
spending – and an over 100% increase with column (2).  Of course, these large values stem 
entirely from the small values of the coefficient estimates. 
 Regarding grade 8 reading, both computations indicate over a 100% rise in funding to 
attain the one-half standard deviation score increase.  For the grade 4 and grade 8 math scores, a 
somewhat different picture emerges.  Referring to columns (5) and (7), the necessary funding 
increase is $2,788 for grade 4 and $3,209 for grade 8.  These translate into 21% and 24% funding 
increases, respectively.  The computations from columns (6) and (8), though, show much larger 
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values.  For the grade 4 math computation in column (6), the funding increase needed is 87% and 
for grade 8 math in column (8) it is 63%.   
Table 7:  Summary Estimates:  The Association of Per Pupil Funding to Test Scores 
 Grade 4 Reading Grade 8 Reading Grade 4 Math Grade 8 Math 
 (1)a (2)b (3)a (4)b (5)a (6)b (7)a (8)b 
Points from 
$1K of funds 
.699 .255 .248 .203 1.216 .290 1.390 .529 
Funding for a 
½σ score 
changec 
$5,422 $14,863 $13,327 $16,281 $2,788 $11,690 $3,209 $8,431 
aBased on column (3) estimates in the above four tables with state fixed effects. 
bBased on column (4) estimates in the above four tables with state and year fixed effects. 
cYearly standard deviations of test scores vary.  We use the average yearly standard deviation for 
each test.  One-half of these are 3.79 for grade 4 reading, 3.305 for grade 8 reading, 3.39 for 
grade 4 math, and 4.46 for grade 8 math.  
 
C. Findings for Black Student Scores 
 We consider if the influence of funding has a different effect on average black student 
scores than on the average of all students.  If the effect on black student scores is substantially 
larger, then the funding tends to reduce racial inequality in scores.   
 Table 8 shows the findings for both grade 4 and 8 reading scores, where the dependent 
variable is the state’s average NAEP score for black students.  We report on the specification 
with just state effects and also that with both state and year effects.  Overall the findings are 
similar to above in that the estimates with state effects only are larger, but the magnitude of the 
effects are quite small.  The effect of funding on black student scores is somewhat larger for 
some of the specification, though not for all.5 
 
 
                                                            
5 The sample sizes for the black student results are smaller because not all states report black student scores for all 
years.  When we estimate using the same sample of states, comparable findings appear.  
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 Table 8:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 and 8 Reading, Black Students 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Reading Score, Black Students 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Grade 4 Grade 8 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
.9114 
(4.73) 
.0645 
(0.32) 
.5788 
(3.84) 
.3445 
(2.00) 
Demographics yes yes yes yes 
State effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects no yes no yes 
R2 .7405 .8172 .7712 .7982 
N 447 447 359 359 
 
 Table 9 presents the results for grade 4 and grade 8 math scores for black students, 
organized as in Table 8.  Very similar comments apply as with the reading scores.  Even though 
a number of the coefficients are larger for black student scores, the small magnitudes imply that  
Table 9:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 and 8 Math, Black Students 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Math Score, Black Students 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Grade 4 Grade 8 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
1.3818 
(6.44) 
.0927 
(0.53) 
1.8914 
(9.31) 
.7355 
(3.40) 
Demographics yes yes yes yes 
State effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects no yes no yes 
R2 .8633 .9326 .8536 .8920 
N 411 411 416 416 
 
there is very little effect on score inequality.  For example, if the effect on black students is 0.50 
higher than on all students (the largest of the different effects that we find), a $1,000 increase in 
funding raises black student scores by a half point more that all students.  The differential 
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between the average score of black students and all of students varies across the tests, but is at 
least 16 points (the black-white differential is larger).  Thus, such a change implies a very 
minimal effect on score inequality 
D. Effects by Source of Funds 
 Funds for public schools may come from three sources: the federal government, state 
government, or local government.6  Because funds from different levels of government may be 
earmarked for certain uses and have various restrictions and rules on their use, the effectiveness 
may differ by fund source.  Thus, we re-estimate our test score equations by replacing the total 
per pupil funding with three variables:  federal, state, and local per pupil funding.  Tables 10 and 
11 present the findings.  We show only two specifications; that with state effects and that with 
state and year effects.  The results for grades 4 and 8 reading are in Table 10, and those for the 
math scores are in Table 11.  
 As with the previous results, the coefficient for the state effect only specifications are 
almost always larger for reasons noted above.  Generally, the effects of local funding are the 
most robust in the sense of consistently attaining statistical significance and often being the 
largest in magnitude.  However, as above, their magnitudes are still such that the association with 
test scores is very, very small.   
 State per pupil funding tends to be the smallest in magnitude and often does not attain 
statistical significance, with the exception of the grade 8 math scores. Federal funding has strong 
effects in the state effects only specifications, but generally has very weak effects when year 
effects are included.  
 
                                                            
6 There are also small amounts of funds from private sources through fees and donations that we count as local.  
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Table 10:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 and 8 Reading, Effects of Funding Source 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Reading Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Grade 4 Grade 8 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real federal revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
.6529 
(1.21) 
.482 
(0.57) 
.6409 
(1.76) 
.7207 
(1.19) 
Real state revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
.362 
(2.31) 
-.1002 
(0.66) 
.100 
(0.84) 
.0434 
(0.38) 
Real local revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
1.0299 
(6.39) 
.5758 
(3.80) 
.3052 
(2.55) 
.3286 
(2.90) 
Demographics yes yes yes yes 
State effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects no yes no yes 
R2 .8877 .9134 .9371 .9505 
N 523 523 436 436 
 
 
Table 11:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 and 8 Math, Effects of Funding Source 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Math Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Grade 4 Grade 8 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real federal revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
3.6484 
(4.98) 
-.3461 
(0.42) 
3.4682 
(5.50) 
-.8934 
(0.89) 
Real state revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
.8357 
(4.19) 
.0858 
(0.60) 
1.121 
(6.42) 
.3458 
(2.15) 
Real local revenue per pupil,  
lagged one year ($1,000) 
1.1897 
(6.01) 
.5033 
(3.64) 
1.2634 
(7.31) 
.7316 
(4.75) 
Demographics yes yes yes yes 
State effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects no yes no yes 
R2 .8952 .9546 .9193 .9451 
N 484 484 517  
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E. Revisiting the Productivity of Educational Funding 
 This subsection revisits the productivity of educational funding over time with use of the 
cross-state panel of observations rather than with the national-level data, as in the previous 
section.  These data provide over time as well as across state variation in funding and test scores 
to examine productivity.  For each state and year, we compute productivity as above:  NAEP test 
score points per $1,000 of funding.  We then estimate models as in equation (2).  
(2)                Pjt = a0 + a1Xjt + θj + δt + ujt 
where j indexes states, t indexes time.  The term Pjt is state j’s productivity at time t (where we 
estimate separate equations for each test), ujt is white noise, and Xjt, θj , and δt  are as above:  a 
vector of demographics for state j at time t, a vector of state effect dummy variables, and a vector 
of year effect dummy variables, respectively.   
 We report two specifications for each test score.  The first is with only time dummies and 
the second also includes the demographics and the state dummies.  Thus, we consider the time 
path of productivity, both with and without adjustment for demographics and state effects.  Table 
12 reports the findings for grades 4 and 8 reading scores.  The “baseline” is mean productivity in 
the first year the test was given.  Coefficients show the change in productivity from the baseline 
year, both with no adjustment (columns (1) and (3)) and with adjustment (columns (2) and (4)).   
 The time effect coefficients in Table 12 are all negative with most statistically significant.  
Generally, the coefficients become larger with time, until 2011 when they decline.  This is 
consistent with the national level data on productivity, and corresponds to the decline in funding 
after the recession.  Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients of columns (1) and (3) in Table 
12 are quite consistent with national productivity declines found in the national data.  
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Table 12:  Productivity of Funding on Reading Scores, by Year, Grades 4 and 8 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Reading Score per $1,000 of School Funding 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Grade 4 Grade 8 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1992 24.4235a 24.4235a   
1994 
-.8695 
(0.94) 
-.8686 
(2.74) 
  
1998 
-1.7158 
(1.85) 
-2.4483 
(5.32) 
27.9202a 27.9202a 
2002 
-4.3905 
(4.86) 
-5.7622 
(11.26) 
-3.6477 
(3.40) 
-3.6646 
(11.14) 
2003 
-5.2197 
(5.98) 
-6.4491 
(12.08) 
-4.7267 
(4.60) 
-4.1996 
(12.05) 
2005 
-5.7519 
(6.59) 
-6.8210 
(13.90) 
-5.5221 
(5.37) 
-4.6342 
(12.07) 
2007 
-6.4392 
(7.38) 
-8.1799 
(14.21) 
-6.5185 
(6.34) 
-5.8904 
(13.34) 
2009 
-7.2994 
(8.37) 
-9.5670 
(15.36) 
-7.4351 
(7.23) 
-7.3969 
(14.71) 
2011 
-7.6469 
(8.76) 
-10.3871 
(14.64) 
-7.7497 
(7.54) 
-7.7747 
(15.37) 
2013 
-6.6353 
(7.61) 
-8.9815 
(10.70) 
-6.4754 
(6.30) 
-4.5775 
(5.73) 
2015 
-6.4536 
(7.40) 
-9.8629 
(12.10) 
-6.4809 
(6.30) 
-6.7137 
(10.52) 
Demographics no yes no yes 
State effects no yes no yes 
R2 .2621 .9368 .1633 .9508 
N 523 523 436 436 
           aBaseline year for each test. 
 
Table 13 presents the analogous results for grades 4 and 8 math scores.  All year effect 
coefficients are negative, are mostly significant, and their magnitudes in columns (1) and (3) line 
up quite closely with the national data.  Regarding columns (2) and (4) in both tables, these 
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coefficients show that same pattern, but the magnitudes tend to be larger.  This implies that if 
demographics and other state-level conditions remained the same as they were in the first year of 
the test, productivity would have dropped even more 
Table 13:  Productivity of Funding on Math Scores, by Year, Grades 4 and 8 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Math Score per $1,000 of School Funding 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Grade 4 Grade 8 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1990   30.0736a 30.0736a 
1992 
24.7569a 24.7569a -.17887 
(0.15) 
-.58662 
(1.46) 
1996 
-1.3355 
(1.39) 
-2.1153 
(4.75) 
-1.1689 
(0.98) 
-2.2341 
(3.79) 
2000 
-2.6333 
(2.70) 
-4.105 
(8.47) 
-3.2697 
(2.72) 
-5.2611 
(7.98) 
2003 
-4.0896 
(4.42) 
-5.1371 
(8.42) 
-5.6190 
(4.94) 
-7.7371 
(10.10) 
2005 
-4.4560 
(4.81) 
-5.7665 
(8.89) 
-6.2840 
(5.53) 
-8.6970 
(12.26) 
2007 
-5.2316 
(5.65) 
-6.7580 
(10.52) 
-7.1534 
(6.29) 
-10.2214 
(12.78) 
2009 
-6.1206 
(6.61) 
-7.9755 
(11.39) 
-8.0966 
(7.12) 
-11.5434 
(14.83) 
2011 
-6.4292 
(6.95) 
-8.5372 
(11.07) 
-8.4706 
(7.45) 
-12.5275 
(14.44) 
2013 
-5.2793 
(5.70) 
-7.6944 
(9.15) 
-7.2230 
(6.35) 
-11.763 
(12.19) 
2015 
-5.3076 
(5.73) 
-7.8027 
(8.95) 
-7.2777 
(6.40) 
-12.0277 
(11.75) 
Demographics no yes no yes 
State effects no yes no yes 
R2 .1632 .9357 .2416 .9328 
N 484 484 517 517 
           aBaseline year for each test. 
 
30 
 
 V. Conclusion 
 It is clear that educational productivity, as measured by NAEP test scores per dollar of 
funding, continues to decline.  Though test scores did improve during the 2000s, this 
improvement was far outstripped by increased educational funding, causing further reductions in 
productivity.  Our analysis of the cross-state panel shows positive and statistically significant 
associations of school funding to NAEP test scores, but with very small magnitudes.  Our 
preferred estimates imply that the magnitude is so small that $1,000 more of per pupil funding is 
associated with less than one point higher NAEP test scores (where scores average over 200).   
This is consistent with the continued decline in productivity that we verify in the cross-state data.  
Similar results hold for black student scores, implying that the increased funding has not served 
to raise minority outcomes or to reduce racial inequality in test scores.  We examine the 
influence of federal, state, and local funding separately, and generally find the effect of local 
funding to be the largest and most robust.  However, the magnitude of the effects remain very 
small.   
 While it is appropriate to be cautious regarding causality with respect to funding and 
outcomes, the continued decline in educational productivity seems very evident.  Schools are 
predominantly government-sponsored organizations, often with little competition, and the 
literature is quite clear regarding incentive problems in these types of organizations.  The lack of 
efficiency should not be surprising.  We suggest looking for improvements in educational 
performance by turning to alternatives that embrace or emulate private-sector, competitive 
organizations.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1:  NAEP National Reading and Mathematics Scores 
 
Panel (a):  Reading NAEP Scores and Gains from 1971 
 
 
Panel (b): Math NAEP Scores and Gains from 1978 
 
               Source:  National Center for Educational Statistics, The Nation’s Report Card,     
               https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/lttdata/. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Gr 4 Read Gr 4 Gain from 1971 Gr 8 Read Gr 8 Gain from 1971
1971 208 0 255 0
1975 210 2 256 1
1980 215 7 258 3
1984 211 3 257 2
1988 212 4 257 2
1990 209 1 257 2
1992 211 3 260 5
1994 211 3 258 3
1996 212 4 258 3
1999 212 4 259 4
2004 216 8 257 2
2008 220 12 260 5
2012 221 13 263 8
Mean 212.92 258.09
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Gr 4 Math Gr 4 Gain from 1978 Gr 8 Math Gr 8 Gain from 1978
1978 219 0 264 0
1982 219 0 269 5
1986 222 3 269 5
1990 230 11 270 6
1992 230 11 273 9
1994 231 12 274 10
1996 231 12 274 10
1999 232 13 276 12
2004 239 20 279 15
2008 243 24 281 17
2012 244 25 285 21
Mean 230.80 274.08
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Table A2:  Real School Revenue and Expenditure, U.S., 2016 $ 
 
Year 
Total 
Revenue 
Revenue, 
Federal 
Revenue, 
State 
Revenue, 
Local 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Instructional 
Expenditure 
1971 5748 485 2248 3015 5748 4990 
 
1972 6232 557 2385 3291 5938 5211 
 
1973 6161 535 2447 3179 6034 5368 
 
1974 6238 528 2583 3127 6056 5361 
 
1975 6381 575 2680 3126 6351 5610 
 
1976 6706 595 2976 3134 6596 5844 
 
1977 6731 592 2907 3229 6628 5976 
 
1978 6880 650 2958 3272 6779 6171 
 
1979 6837 668 3118 3050 6709 6134 
 
1980 6776 665 3172 2940 6670 6084 
 
1981 6837 630 3238 2968 6679 6092 
 
1982 6848 509 3259 3080 6850 6280 
 
1983 7156 508 3428 3220 7148 6594 
 
1984 7418 505 3545 3369 7428 6791 
 
1985 7811 518 3821 3471 7708 7187 
 
1986 8284 554 4089 3640 8156 7619 
 
1987 8425 539 4190 3696 8440 7779 4793 
1988 8598 543 4260 3795 8744 7966 4955 
1989 9248 573 4420 4255 9171 8337 5074 
1990 9446 575 4450 4421 9637 8526 5143 
1991 9549 589 4503 4457 9809 8638 5226 
1992 9544 630 4426 4488 9807 8593 5227 
1993 9606 670 4399 4537 9812 8571 5236 
1994 9693 683 4377 4633 9884 8626 5277 
1995 9752 663 4560 4528 9961 8707 5375 
1996 9815 652 4662 4501 10016 8702 5372 
1997 10006 659 4803 4544 10271 8861 5482 
1998 10406 709 5032 4665 10672 9113 5635 
1999 10753 759 5241 4753 11015 9376 5782 
2000 11091 806 5491 4794 11358 9632 5948 
2001 11523 835 5730 4957 11794 10001 6153 
2002 11740 928 5780 5032 12184 10309 6343 
2003 11910 1015 5798 5096 12310 10489 6433 
2004 12093 1097 5690 5306 12403 10558 6477 
2005 12284 1129 5756 5399 12582 10705 6549 
2006 12620 1153 5870 5598 12817 10898 6636 
2007 13048 1107 6190 5751 13200 11196 6825 
2008 13224 1079 6392 5752 13492 11462 6971 
2009 13453 1287 6279 5886 13859 11784 7177 
2010 13323 1695 5793 5835 13540 11718 7163 
2011 13028 1629 5752 5647 13031 11370 6955 
2012 12676 1289 5730 5657 12703 11126 6776 
Source:  National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current_tables.asp.   
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Table A3:  Productivity.  NAEP Points per $1000 of Education Revenue 
Year Grade 4 Read Grade 8 Read Grade 4 Math Grade 8 Math 
1971 36.2 44.4 
  
1975 32.9 40.1 
  
1978 
  
31.8 38.4 
1980 31.7 38.1 
  
1982 
  
32.0 39.2 
1984 28.4 34.7 
  
1986 
  
26.8 32.5 
1988 24.7 29.9 
  
1990 22.1 27.2 24.3 28.6 
1992 22.1 27.2 24.1 28.6 
1994 21.8 26.6 23.8 28.3 
1996 21.6 26.3 23.5 27.9 
1999 19.7 24.1 21.6 25.7 
2004 17.9 21.2 19.8 23.1 
2008 16.6 19.6 18.4 21.3 
2012 17.4 20.7 19.2 22.5 
                      Source:  National Center for Educational Statistics, The Nation’s Report Card, 
                      https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/lttdata/ and Digest of Educational Statistics,  
                    https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current_tables.asp. 
 
 
Table A4:  Years of State-Based NAEP Assessments 
Year Grade 4 Reading Grade 8 Reading Grade 4 Math Grade 8 Math 
1990    selected states 
1992 selected states selected states selected states  
1994 selected states    
1996   selected states selected states 
1998 selected states selected states   
2000   selected states selected states 
2002 selected states selected states   
2003 all states all states all states all states 
2005 all states all states all states all states 
2007 all states all states all states all states 
2009 all states all states all states all states 
2011 all states all states all states all states 
2013 all states all states all states all states 
2015 all states all states all states all states 
          Source:  National Center for Educational Statistics, The Nation’s Report Card. 
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Table A5:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 Reading Equation* 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 4 Reading Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil  
(lagged one year) 
.0006119 
(6.16) 
.0002567 
(2.94) 
.0006992 
(6.51) 
.0002549 
(2.18) 
Percent White 
 .1639922 
(7.92) 
-.2041423 
(3.79) 
-.0031506 
(0.06) 
Percent Black 
 -.0901961 
(3.92) 
-.573056 
(7.91) 
-.4595293 
(6.53) 
Percent Hispanic 
 .1033978 
(4.00) 
.0380793 
(1.31) 
.0245305 
(0.94) 
Percent School Lunch  
Eligible 
 -.156467 
(6.45) 
-.0027509 
(0.09) 
-.13664 
(3.42) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners 
 -.3307864 
(2.63) 
-.0077471 
(0.08) 
-.02928 
(0.32) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners assessed 
 .1026955 
(0.67) 
-.1103212 
(0.97) 
-.1582443 
(1.44) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners accommodated 
 .3362454 
(3.24) 
.1116681 
(1.32) 
.2991223 
(2.87) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability 
 .4376456 
(3.39) 
.3860687 
(3.91) 
.2853661 
(2.86) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability assessed 
 -.8676102 
(5.28) 
-.7096491 
(6.14) 
-.5043579 
(4.60) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability accommodated 
 1.17883 
(8.11) 
.4411311 
(3.83) 
-.06893 
(0.58) 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.0680 0.6432 0.8853 0.9108 
N 523 523 523 523 
             *For sources and variable definitions, see Table 2. 
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Table A6:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 8 Reading Equation* 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 8 Reading Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil  
(lagged one year) 
.0003064 
(3.24) 
.0001131 
(1.57) 
.0002478 
(3.09) 
.0002033 
(2.35) 
Percent White 
 .1534081 
(9.78) 
.0788794 
(1.49) 
.097364 
(1.80) 
Percent Black 
 -.0741953 
(4.17) 
-.3238809 
(4.49) 
-.2197445 
(3.16) 
Percent Hispanic 
 .1035303 
(4.94) 
.0542785 
(0.94) 
.0465352 
(0.88) 
Percent School Lunch  
Eligible 
 -.221742 
(10.28) 
.1793948 
(6.26) 
.004827 
(0.14) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners 
 .2975124 
(1.51) 
.2615761 
(2.12) 
.045122 
(0.37) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners assessed 
 -.8038768 
(3.68) 
-.4592573 
(3.09) 
-.3011538 
(2.12) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners accommodated 
 .7371854 
(7.03) 
.3659163 
(4.68) 
.228682 
(2.39) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability 
 .003481 
(0.03) 
.1903165 
(2.11) 
.3077137 
(3.37) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability assessed 
 -.7712474 
(5.66) 
-.7275993 
(7.55) 
-.8404803 
(8.98) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability accommodated 
 .8434071 
(8.32) 
.3534601 
(3.13) 
.2961936 
(3.04) 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.0236 0.7636 0.9366 0.9499 
N 436 436 436 436 
             *For sources and variable definitions, see Table 2. 
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Table A7:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 4 Math Equation* 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 4 Math Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil  
(lagged one year) 
.0012101 
(9.39) 
.0002094 
(1.97) 
.0012159 
(8.14) 
.0002902 
(2.55) 
Percent White 
 .107246 
(3.68) 
.2917496 
(2.92) 
.1228174 
(1.64) 
Percent Black 
 -.136853 
(4.49) 
.0326449 
(0.36) 
-.2407664 
(2.58) 
Percent Hispanic 
 -.0241265 
(0.59) 
.0686704 
(0.67) 
.0880234 
(1.26) 
Percent School Lunch  
Eligible 
 -.0874069 
(2.75) 
.3015466 
(6.77) 
-.117845 
(2.88) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners 
 -1.571452 
(5.42) 
-.7669221 
(3.09) 
-.4131196 
(2.47) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners assessed 
 1.869721 
(5.95) 
1.037856 
(4.21) 
.3045977 
(1.77) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners accommodated 
 .2175722 
(1.27) 
.011931 
(0.08) 
.103427 
(1.19) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability 
 .0801938 
(0.37) 
.3870232 
(2.11) 
.2729143 
(2.07) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability assessed 
 -.648937 
(2.35) 
-.5717215 
(2.64) 
-.39699 
(2.70) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability accommodated 
 1.930095 
(10.69) 
1.145408 
(7.24) 
.1124339 
(0.93) 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.1546 0.6981 0.8916 0.9538 
N 484 484 484 484 
             *For sources and variable definitions, see Table 2. 
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Table A8:  Coefficient Estimates, Grade 8 Math Equation* 
 
Dependent Variable:   NAEP Grade 8 Math Score 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real revenue per pupil  
(lagged one year) 
.0011562 
(8.74) 
.000437 
(3.41) 
.0013896 
(10.78) 
.0005193 
(4.00) 
Percent White 
 .1618097 
(5.58) 
.3190889 
(3.10) 
.3438009 
(3.67) 
Percent Black 
 -.2167494 
(6.67) 
.0898037 
(0.66) 
-.1600979 
(1.30) 
Percent Hispanic 
 .0550193 
(1.45) 
.5961319 
(4.66) 
.3799881 
(3.49) 
Percent School Lunch  
Eligible 
 -.1101374 
(3.16) 
.295285 
(8.71) 
.0235089 
(0.49) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners 
 -.8544714 
(2.07) 
-.010864 
(0.04) 
-.1644773 
(0.74) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners assessed 
 1.028798 
(2.33) 
-.0082677 
(0.03) 
.0061493 
(0.03) 
Pct. English Language 
Learners accommodated 
 .0870519 
(0.23) 
-.2693493 
(1.07) 
.0159452 
(0.07) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability 
 -.2139781 
(1.02) 
.3261958 
(2.41) 
.1200237 
(0.97) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability assessed 
 -.9922245 
(4.05) 
-.7905019 
(5.30) 
-.4907514 
(3.61) 
Pct. Students with  
Disability accommodated 
 1.852907 
(10.33) 
.705193 
(5.65) 
.14871 
(1.13) 
State effects no no yes yes 
Year effects no no no yes 
R2 0.1291 0.6638 0.9171 0.9443 
N 517 517 517 517 
             *For sources and variable definitions, see Table 2. 
 
 
